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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL JOAN STONE, 
Respondent, 
-vs-





---- ---- ··::1·~--i:·--s~~r.:imo c~~--· 
PETITION FOR REHEARING_ .. , 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorney at Law 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NEIL D. SCHAERRER 
Attorney at Law 
1300 walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
\. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL JOAN STONE, 
Responaent 
-vs-
VAL FRANKLIN STONE, 
No. 
10698 
Appellant and Petitioner 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Appellant by his attorney here-
by petitions the above entitlea Court 
for a rehearing upon the sole issue of 
whether the trial court errea in de-
ciding there was not "gooa cause" shown 
to require the Respondent to submit to 
a psychiatric examination pursuant to 
Rule 35 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
This motion is made pursuant to 
Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and for the following reasons: 
1. The holding of the majority 
opinion that insanity and other mental 
conditions can be established without 
expert testimony is contrary to the over-
whelming weight of authority, and deprives 
the trial judges in the State of Utah of 
the testimony of psychiatrists in Rule 
35 (a) hearings. 
2. The majority opinion is de-
ficient because it nowhere defines 
"good cause" notwithstanding the entire 
Rule 35 (a) issue depends upon good 
cause being shown. 
3. The maj.ori ty opinion has in-
creased the burden of proof required 
for "good cause" over that of any other 
state in this country, and has in effect 
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judicially invalidated the Rule insofar 
as the State of Utah is concerned. 
4. The majority opinion sacrifices 
the welfare of the minor children to the 
welfare of the mother, and decides this 
case upon an affidavit which was not pre-
sented to nor considered by any of the 
three District Court Judges who heard 
this matter. 
I 
THE HOLDING OF THE .MAJORITY OPINION 
THAT INSANITY AND OTHER MENTAL CONDITIONS 
CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT EXPERT TESTI-
MONY rs CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING 
WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY, AND DEPRIVES THE 
TRIAL JUDGES IN THE STATE OF UTAH OF THE 
TESTIMONY OF PSYCHIATRISTS IN RULE 35 (a) 
HEARINGS. . 
The majority opinion holds that the 
testimony of the mother's psychiatrist 
was properly excluded on the basis of the 
doctor-patient privilege and that the 
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issue of insanity and other mental con-
ditions contemplated by Rule 35 could be 
determined without expert testimony. Such 
a holding is contrary to the overwhelming 
weight of authority. See Bowler v. Bowler, 
355 Mich. 686, 96 N. W. 2d 129 (1959) 
and 74 A.L.R. 2d 1073 entitled Mental 
Health of Contesting Parent as a Factor 
in Awarding Child Custody. All of the 
cases collected in this annotation in-
volve expert testimony by psychiatrists 
and the Courts' holdings are based there-
on. A substantial number of these cases 
conclude that observations by lay wit-
nesses such as neighbors, etc. are in-
sufficient. However, the majority 
opinion of this Court has effectively 
deprived the trial judges in the State 
of Utah of the testimony of expert 
psychiatrists if these cases arise in 
the future and has in affect held that 
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the issue of insanity can be determined 
by the testimony of lay witnesses even 
though such testimony might be diametri-
cally opposed to the testimony of the 
psychiatrist--one whose training and 
experience better qualify him to diag-
nose and evaluate such problems. 
Randa v. ~. 312 P. 2d 640 (1957-
Washington) is a case very similar in 
nature to the instant case. In Randa 
a litigant claimed the doctor-patient 
privilege when asked about prior history 
with her doctor. The lower court sus-
tained the objection, but the Supreme 
Court reversed on this ruling and stated: 
"In the present case, it is 
obvious that the use of the 
physician-patient privilege 
deprived the court of all 
opportunity to ascertain the 
material facts necessary to 
its determination of the prin-
cipal issue raised by the 
pleadings ••• " [Note 8 p. 645] 
In Randa the Respondent cited a 
prior case upholding the doctor-patient 
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privilege, but the Supreme Court over-
ruled this case on the basis of Rule 35 
of the Washington Rules of Civil Proced-
ure which are identical to those in Utah. 
The Court held: 
"Thus this court, by adopting 
Rule of Pleading, Practice 
and Procedure 35, intended to 
correct the injus_tice which was 
permitted to exist in the Nolle 
case so that now a trial court 
can no longer be compelled by a 
claim of privilege to decide any 
case involving the mental or 
physical condition of any party 
to the action after hearing only 
a part of the evidence material 
to that issue. The means is now 
available to the court to have 
access to all material facts 
relating to the mental or physi-
cal condition of any party in 
any case where such condition is 
in controversy. The rule of the 
Nolle case has in effect, been 
abrogated by the adoption of 
Rule of Pleading, Practice and 
Procedure 35." 
The Appellant submits the Wash-
ington citation, together with the 
citation set forth hereinafter from 
The united States Supreme court and 
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the various State Courts, clearly es-
tablishes the correct principle of 
interpretation which is that Rule 35 
(a) makes it possible now for the trial 
judge to receive evidence from qualified 
psychiatrists whereas under the common 
law this was impossible becuase of the 
doctor-patient privilege. However, the 
majority opinion in the instant case has 
buried this enlighted interpretation and 
has in effect resurrected the conunon law 
privilege so that it now exists in the 
State of Utah and so that now Rule 35 (a) 
has no application to mental examinations. 
II 
THE MAJORITY OPINION IS DEFICIENT 
BECAUSE IT NOW1iERE DEFINES "GOOD CAUSE" 
NO'l'WITHSTANDING THE ENTIRE RULE 35 (a) 
ISSUE DEPENDS UPON GOOD CAUSE BEING 
SHOWN. 
The majority opinion nowhere defines 
"good cause" and in fact that term is not 
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even mentioned in the majority opinion; 
notwithstanding the entire issue in this 
case depends upon whether "good cause" 
for a mental examination was shown. 
The majority opinion cites Rule 35 (a) 
then promptly ignores the good cause 
aspect and goes on to something else. 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion re-
cognizes that "good cause" is the pivotal 
point in this case and elaborates on 
exactly what quantum of proof is required. 
The majority opinion on the otherhand, 
leaves the reader in complete darkness 
as to what facts a litigant.must pro-
duce to show "good cause." 
The Appellant further submits that 
by failing to define "good cause" and by 
failing to cite any evidence upon which 
the majority opinion bases its conclu-
sion, this Court has left Appellant with-
out any idea of what would be important 
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or material in the future if the mother 
had recurring symptoms of mental illness. 
The majority opinion has corranended the 
trial judge for saying, that, "If it 
appears that at some future time that a 
psychiatric and physical examination is 
necessary, application to the court shall 
be made imrr.ediately;" however, it has not 
suggested what facts might be sufficient 
for such an application. The majority 
opinion as it now stands could well 
mean that the father would need addi-
tional symptoms to those set forth in 
the dissenting opinion of Justice Ellett 
before any further application could be 
justified. This would mean that if the 
mother suffered these same symptoms to-
morrow and if the father tried to make 
application to the Court for a Rule 35 
commitment as Judge Hanson suggests, 
that counsel for the mother could cite 
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the majority opinion as saying that there 
was not sufficient evidence shown for such 
a commitment. It would then be incumbent 
upon the father to produce additional 
evidence; even though any psychiatrist 
would concede that such symptoms warrant 
not only a Rule 35 conunitment but also 
hospitalization. The Appellant submits 
that such a ruling goes far beyond any 
"good cause" requirements contemplated 
by Rule 35, and in effect makes it im-
possible to ever use Judge Hanson's 
suggestion. 
III 
THE MAJORITY OPINION HAS INCREASED 
'11HE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED FOR "GOOD 
CAUSE" OVER THAT OF ANY OTHER STATE IN 
THIS COUNTRY, AND HAS IN EFFECT JUDICIALLY 
INVALIDATED THE RULE INSOFAR AS THE STATE 
OF UTAH IS CONCERNED. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice 
Ellett as it appears on Page 6 of the 
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green sheets, contains the general rules 
relating to the quantum of proof required 
for a "good cause" commitment. The 
United States Supreme Court has held 
that it takes very little showing to 
convince the court that there is "good 
cause" for having an examination in a 
proper case, and the Appellant submits 
it is error for this Court to go so much 
further than the United States Supreme 
Court has gone. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 
379 v. s. 104, 13 L. Ed. 2d 152, 85 S. 
CT. 234 (1965). 
The majority opinion states in part 
as follows: 
"While there is some evidence 
that the Plaintiff has at times 
been somewhat erratic in her be-
havior, there is countervailing 
evidence that the mental and/or 
nervous difficulties she suffered 
from had been temporary, and that 
she was a good mother to her 
children. The capstone on this 
point is that upon disputed evi-
dence, the trial court made an 
affirmative finding that she was 
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not mentally incompetent nor 
otherwise unfit to care for 
them." [Emphasis added] 
The Appellant will readily concede 
that Rule 35 matters are discretionary 
with the trial judge when there is a 
conflict in the testimony. However, 
Appellant submits the salient facts in 
this case are not in dispute. The 
following facts testified to by the wit-





The Plaintiff could not identify 
her own children on at least 
two occasions. On one of these 
occasions, a neighbor took the 
mother to primary and when the 
neighbor brought the children 
out to the car, the mother 
told her to take them back, 
that they were not.her children. 
On another occasion, the 
mother told the father that the 
principal had sent the wrong 
children home from school and 
she wanted him to do something 
about them. 
The Plaintiff believed she had 
a tape recorder in her head. 
The Plaintiff believed her 
neighbors were spying on her. 
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D. The Plaintiff had her phone 
changed because she felt other 
people were spying on her. 
E. These symptoms were not tem-
porary but had persisted over 
a period from June, 1965, to 
April, 1966, and were a recur-
rence of symptoms that had 
arisen in 1958-1960 and had 
required the mother to be 
hospitalized and treated with 
electric shock. Furthermore, 
the mother's psychiatrist had 
been treating her continuously 
since 1958 to the time of the 
trial and he so testified. 
F. The Plaintiff's psychiatrist 
had reconunended that she be 
committed to a mental hos-
pital for psychiatric evalua-
tion. 
G. The Plaintiff refused to let 
her psychiatrist testify in 
Court as to whether or not 
she was insane. 
The Appellant submits these facts are 
not disputed by anyone testifying at the 
trial and submits that any inference that 
they were disputed cannot be justified by 
reference to any page in the record on 
appeal in this case. It is true that 
there was some dispute on other issues 
-13-
--
such as whether the mother washed the 
children properly and fed and clothed them, 
but the Appellant submits that as to the 
salient mental facts there was no dispute. 
Moreover, even if the evidence was con-
flicting the burden of showing "good 
cause" was certainly sustained by the 
facts presented at the hearing before 
Judge Hanson, and the evidence produced 
at that hearing is the only evidence that 
would be important to this Court. It was 
this evidence which the trial judge used 
to render his decision and not the allega-
tions in an affidavit or in -the answers to 
any interrogatories as suggested in the 
majority opinion by this Court. 
By holding that the facts set forth 
above, and in Justice Ellett's opinion, 
do not establish "good cause", the majority 
opinion has in effect equated good cause 
with preponderance of the evidence, or 
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possibly with an even higher degree of 
proof. It has also substantially raised 
the degree of proof which has heretofore 
been required in Utah for "good cause" 
production of documents under Rule 34, 
and for "good cause" physical examinations 
in personal injury cases. This is con-
trary to all of the authorities. In 
addition to Schlagenhauf, supra., see 
also the following: Beach v. Beach, 114 
F. 2d 479 (1940); Greyhound Corp. v. 
Superior Court, Merced county, 15 cal. 
Rptr. 90, 364 P. 2d 266 (1961). Note 
22 p. 283 wherein "good caus.e" is dis-
cussed at length; 4 Moore's Federal Prac-
tice 2449 Section 34.08 "Showing of Good 
cause," and page 2559 where the author 
states, "it will usually be easy enough 
to make such a showing where the physical 
or mental condition of the party is actually 
in controversy"; Richardson v. Richardson, 
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236 P. 2d 121 (1951). Note 10 p. 126. 
IV 
THE MAJORITY OPINION SACRIFICES THE!' 
WELFARE OF TrIE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE WEL-
FARE OF THE MOTHER, AND DECIDES THIS CASE 
UPON AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH WAS NOT PRESENTED 
·ro NOR CONSIDERED BY ANY OF THE THREE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WHO HEARD THIS 
.r.'JATTER. 
The majority opinion states in part 
as follows: 
"The question of a person's 
sanity nearly always involves 
considerable delicacy. If mere 
allegations in an affidavit com-
pelled the court to require a 
party to submit to a psychiatric 
examination, a way would be open 
for opposing parties to harass, 
annoy or intimidate each other. 
The potential for mischief in such 
a situation is obvious and the 
court would always be well advised 
in exercising caution and restraint 
in regard to such a request, as it 
appears was done here." [Emphasis 
added]. 
This obvious concern for the welfare 
of the mother is commendable but it fails 
to recognize that the welfare of the 
minor children is paramount in a case 
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of this nature and that any embarrass-
ment to the mother must yield, especially 
when the minor children's future emotional 
and mental condition is at issue as it 
was in the instant case. Moreover the 
fact that the mother had been seeing a 
psychiatrist continually since 1958 to 
the time of the trial argues against any 
embarrassment or danger resulting from 
a Rule 35 (a) examination. The majority 
opinion's concern about opening a pan-
dora's box which would allow mental 
commitments based only on an affidavit is 
not justified by either the Rule itself 
or the facts in this case. 
The Rule itself has a built-in 
protection against such an evil. It 
specifically requires (1) A written 
motion, (2) Notice to adverse party, 
and (3) A hearing on the allegation in 
the motion. The record clearly shows 
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a written motion was filed; notice was 
served upon the Respondent--mother [the 
Sheriff's return says the Defendant, but 
this is an obvious error since the 
Defendant would not have served himself), 
and a hearing was held. The trial judge 
did not look simply to an affidavit as 
the majority opinion seems to imply in 
the citation above. The affidavit has 
absolutely no bearing on this case and 
Appellant does not know why it was cited 
by the majority opinion. The Appellant 
has never suggested at any time that mere 
allegations in an affidavit ·were suffi-
cient; and the trial judge did not base 
his decision on any affidavit. The 
original appeal to this Court claimed 
error on the part of the trial judge in 
deciding that the evidence produced ~ 
the trial was insufficient to warrant 
a Rule 35 conunitment and not that the 
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trial judge decided that some affidavit 
failed to support such a commitment. The 
Appellant readily agrees that the practice 
of law by affidavit as opposed to a~ 
adversary proceeding in open court is 
at best a poor way to establish just;.;i.ce 
and truth. 
The majority opinion has misinter-
preted either the procedure which was used 
in the lower court or the evidence upon 
which the court rendered its decision. 
In either case, the Appellant submits 
that a rehearing is justified to clarify 
these matters since the affidavit aspect 
emphasized by this Court was not a part 
of the trial judge's consideration at all. 
The majority opinion further intimates 
that there was something wrong in consoli-
dating the Rule 35 issue with the other 
matters raised in the petition7 and sug-
gests that the Rule 35 matter should have 
been treated separately and prior to 
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hearing the other matters. Appellant 
attempted to do this both at the April 
8 hearing before Judge Jeppson and at 
the pre-trial hearing before Judge Elton: 
however, counsel for the mother stated 
that he could not be ready to hear even 
the Rule 35 matter for several months be-
cause of his congested office schedule. 
Based upon this representation the law 
and motion judge and the pre-trial judge 
were willing to consolidate all issues 
rather than prolong the matter first for 
a Rule 35 hearing and then later for a 
second hearing on the other points raised 
in the original petition. Apparently, 
the trial judge (Hanson] concurred in 
this procedure because he received testi-
mony on all issues and then rendered his 
opinion on them all including the Rule 35 
matters. In other words, he received 
evidence on the Rule 35 issue and treated . 
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it as a separate matter and made a 
separate order as to it. Nowhere did 
any of the trial judges intimate that it 
was improper to consolidate the Rule 35 
matters with the other issues. Moreover, 
counsel for the mother did not object to 
any part .of this procedure. He has raised 
a procedural irregularity for the first 
time in his brief on appeal to this 
Court and has apparently convinced a 
majority of this Court that the trial 
judges were guilty of some procedural 
error which counsel for the mother sought, 
agreed to, and actively participated in. 
All the father tried to do was to 
get the matter heard as soori as possible 
because he felt there was an aggravated 
situation in the home which required 
immediate attention. He was willing to 
consolidate the Rule 35 matters with the 
other issues set forth in his original 
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petition because that appeared to be the 
quickest way to handle the matter due to 
the mother's counsel's representation that 
his office schedule was too congested to 
hear any of the issues earlier than June 13, 
which was about two and one-half months 
after the original petition was filed. 
This procedure apparently had the blessing 
of three District Court Judges and it makes 
sense. By having only one hearing, the 
trial judge could receive evidence on all 
issues and then take the matter under 
advisement until he received a report 
from an independent Court-appointed 
psychiatrist. After evaluation was 
received, a complete judgment could then 
be entered. The Appellant submits that 
such a consolidation has the further 
advantage of avoiding a multiplicity of 
trials with the attendant extra attorney's 
fees, court costs, and time involved. 
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However, the majority opinion has 
intimated that something was wrong with 
this procedure and Appellant submits 
that a rehearing is justified and would 
be of great benefit to attorneys in this 
State to know what procedure is going to 
be.allowed by this court in matters of 
this nature in the future. 
For the reasons set forth above, 
the Appellant respectfully requests a 
rehearing as to the Rule 35 issue only 
and asks this Court to grant the motion 
for an independent psychiatric examina-
tion and to continue the matter for 
further hearing until the independent 
psychiatrist can give testimony to the 
trial judge after which the trial judge 
should make new findings and such an order 
as is warranted by all of the evidence 
presented to him. The Appellant submits 
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the emotional and mental welfare of the 
minor children justifies such action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
o c3tJY ~r...=.;.J-.~~..i..q......;_~~~~~ 
MES A. McINTOSH 
ttorney for Petitioner 
15 East 4th South 












~: • " 11 
;. •• • .. ( • .J '! 
...... 
the emotional and mental welfare of the 




ttorney for Petitioner 
15 East 4th South 
Salt LakeCity, Utah 
-24-
•· '•' .. · ... :,',' 
